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Summary
This report provides an overview of the major legislative issues facing Congress
in 2001 and 2002 relating to Latin America and the Caribbean.  Organized by the
regions and subregions of the Western Hemisphere, the report provides reference and
linkages to other reports covering the issues in more detail.  The importance of the
region to the United States has been emphasized by President Bush’s trips to Mexico
in February 2001 and March 2002 and his trips to Peru and El Salvador in March
2002, and by a number of congressional trips to the region.
At the hemispheric level, the major legislative issues include the implementation
of the Declaration and Action Plan of hemispheric leaders at Summit of the Americas
III in Quebec City, Canada, in April 2001.  This includes individual and collective
action to achieve the goal of creating a  Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by
2005, to promote democracy throughout the hemisphere, to strengthen multilateral
mechanisms for counter-narcotics activity, and to further sustainable development
and environmental protection in the region.  The hemispheric response to the
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States is also included.  
With neighbor Mexico in North America, the major bilateral issues for the
United States are related to trade, drug trafficking, and migration, as new President
George W. Bush seeks to advance friendly relations with new President Vicente Fox,
the first President of Mexico from an opposition party in over 70 years.
With regard to the Central American and Caribbean region, the major issues are
disaster relief and reconstruction in Central America and the Caribbean, the proposed
Central America-U.S. free trade agreement, earthquakes in El Salvador,
implementation of the peace accords in Guatemala, and the new government in
Nicaragua.  President Bush has announced a “Third Border Initiative” to strengthen
the development of the smaller Caribbean countries, and the President and Congress
will be seeking ways to advance democracy in Cuba and Haiti.
In the Andean region, the major issues are President Bush’s request for new
assistance and additional authorities under the Andean Regional Initiative for
Colombia and regional neighbors, overseeing implementation of the extension of the
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), dealing with the new Toledo government in
Peru, and seeking ways to engage the “maverick” government in Venezuela
following the ouster and return of President Chavez.
In the region encompassing Brazil and the Southern Cone countries of South
America, the major issues are managing trade and economic issues with Brazil as the
country selects a new president, dealing with a serious economic crisis in Argentina,
and completing negotiations for a U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement with Chile.
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1   For information on legislative issues in 2000, see CRS Report RS20474, Latin America:
Overview of Legislative Issues for Congress in 2000, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan. The
current report, organized by regions, is entitled Latin America and the Caribbean to include
the English-speaking countries in the Caribbean area.  The term “Latin America” is a
cultural rather than a geographical term, and includes all countries where Latin-based
languages are spoken.  “Latin America” includes Mexico in North America and most
countries in Central America and South America.  It also includes Cuba and the Dominican
Republic in the Caribbean where Spanish is spoken, Haiti in the Caribbean where French
is spoken, and Brazil in South America where Portuguese is spoken.
Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Legislative Issues in 2001-20021
I.  Hemispheric Issues
Summit of the Americas III
Summit of the Americas III was held in Quebec City, Canada, from April 20-22,
2001, with 34 democratically elected Presidents and Prime Ministers from the
Western Hemisphere in attendance, including George W. Bush from the United
States.  The hemispheric leaders dealt with three major themes: (1) Strengthening
Democracy, where they agreed to a democracy clause that specified that democratic
government was an essential condition for participation in the summit process; (2)
Creating Prosperity, where they agreed to advance toward the conclusion of the
agreement on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005; and (3)
Realizing Human Potential, where they agreed to initiatives to promote education,
health, and greater equity for women, youth, and indigenous peoples. 
For more information, see CRS Report RL30936, Summit of the Americas III,
Quebec City, Canada, April 20-22, 2001: Background, Objectives, and Results, by
K. Larry Storrs and M. Angeles Villarreal.
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
The proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is a regional trade
agreement that would include 34 nations of the Western Hemisphere.  Ideally, it
would promote economic integration by creating a comprehensive (presumably
WTO-plus) framework for reducing tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and
investment.  The FTAA held center stage in discussions at the Third Summit of the
Americas that convened in Quebec on April 20-22, 2001, and despite protests from
various interest groups, all countries except Venezuela signed the Declaration of
Quebec City.  In so doing, they adopted the bracketed or draft text of the FTAA and
reaffirmed the collective commitment to complete negotiations of the FTAA by
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January 2005, with the agreement’s entry into force to occur no later than the end of
the same year.
As the deadline nears, negotiations are becoming more intense; many areas still
present formidable challenges, including market access issues (particularly with
agricultural products), investment rules, antidumping provisions, dispute settlement,
and the perennial issue of environmental and labor provisions.  To the surprise of
some, President Bush gave a nod in Quebec toward addressing many of these issues,
including labor and environmental provisions.  Still, negotiating parties hold
positions that are at odds with each other on many issues and prospects for
completion of the FTAA hinge, to a great extent, on how vigorously the U.S.
Congress embraces the regional trade initiative.  Passage of trade promotion authority
(TPA) legislation in August 2002 (P.L. 107-210) is viewed by many Latin American
countries as indispensable for completing the negotiations; however, there is still a
long way to go to bring this regional agreement to a conclusion.
In November 2002, Brazil and the United States will become co-chairs of the
FTAA Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC), overseeing the final two years of
hemispheric negotiations.  Brazil and the United States are the two largest economies
and have significant differences to resolve, not the least of which was the April 2002
decision by the Bush Administration to levy tariffs on various steel imports in
response to industry requests for relief from foreign competition.  This, disagreement
of treatment of agricultural products, and other trade issues are being highlighted
during the Brazilian presidential election set for October 6, 2002.  In neither country
is there a consensus on the FTAA, and despite some statements by public sector
officials in support of the agreement, private sector discussions still reflect an
ongoing tension between the two countries.  Additional  complications to completing
an FTAA include challenges to economic and social progress in Latin America, such
as the financial crisis in Argentina, the recent large IMF package for Brazil, and
deteriorating political conditions in Venezuela and Colombia.  Setbacks in these
areas raise the potential for eroding stability and the spirit of cooperation that
launched the FTAA negotiations in 1998.  The U.S.-Chile bilateral agreement and
a new U.S. overture toward a U.S.-Central American free trade agreement may also
raise questions in Latin America over whether U.S. policy is firmly set on a regional
approach to trade liberalization in the Western Hemisphere.
For more information, see CRS Report RS20864, A Free Trade Area of the
Americas: Status of Negotiations and Major Policy Issues, by J. F. Hornbeck; CRS
Issue Brief IB95017, Trade and the Americas, by Raymond J. Ahearn; and CRS
Report RL30935, Agricultural Trade in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, by
Remy Jurenas.
Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean
Latin America has made enormous strides in recent years in the development
of democracy, with all countries but Cuba led by democratically-elected heads of
state.  Nonetheless, many government institutions in the region have proven ill-
equipped to deal with challenges to their further development, such as strong, often
autocratic presidents; violent guerrilla conflicts; militaries still not comfortable with
civilian rule; and narcotics trafficking and related crime and corruption.  The
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Organization of American States has also made progress in efforts to promote
democracy in the hemisphere by establishing procedures for collective action when
democracy is interrupted, beginning with the Santiago Commitment to Democracy
in 1991,  and culminating most recently with the adoption of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter in Lima, Peru, on September 11, 2001, the same day as the
terrorist attacks on the United States.  On April 13, 2002, the OAS Permanent
Council, with support from the United States, condemned the alteration of
constitutional order in Venezuela when President Hugo Chavez was temporarily
ousted.  The Council sent an OAS Mission headed by OAS Secretary General Cesar
Gaviria to Venezuela to gather facts and undertake good offices, and it convoked a
special session of the General Assembly to deal with the situation in accordance with
the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
For more information, see CRS Report 98-684, Latin America and the
Caribbean: Fact Sheet on Leaders and Elections, by Mark P. Sullivan, as well as
references cited above on Summit of the Americas III and cited below on Haiti, Peru,
and Venezuela.
Hemispheric Response to September 2001 Terrorist Attacks
Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. and took action through the
Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric
cooperation against terrorism. The OAS, which happened to be meeting in Peru at
the time, swiftly condemned the attacks, reiterated the need to strengthen hemispheric
cooperation to combat terrorism, and expressed full solidarity with the United States.
At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS members invoked the 1947 Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the Rio Treaty, which
obligates signatories to the treaty to come to one another’s defense in case of outside
attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001, called on Rio Treaty
signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and
punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional assistance
and support to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11 attacks,
and also to prevent future terrorist acts.”
In another resolution, the OAS called on the Inter-American Committee on
Terrorism (CICTE) to identify urgent actions aimed at strengthening inter-American
cooperation in order to combat and eliminate terrorism in the hemisphere. The
CICTE was reinvigorated in the aftermath of September 11, and has cooperated on
border security mechanisms, controls to prevent funding of terrorist organizations,
and law enforcement and counterterrorism intelligence and information.   
On June 3, 2002, OAS members meeting in Barbados for the OAS General
Assembly signed a newly completed Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism.
Signing the treaty for the United States, Secretary of State Powell said that the OAS
had “produced the first new international treaty since September 11 targeted at
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2 U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, “Transcript: Powell Stresses
Security at OAS General Assembly,” Washington File, June 3, 2002.
3  U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, “Fact Sheet: Inter-
American Convention Against Terrorism,” Washington File, June 3, 2002.
improving our ability to combat terrorism.”2   The Convention, among other
measures,  improves regional cooperation against terrorism, commits parties to sign
and ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments, commits parties to take actions against the
financing of terrorism, and denies safe haven to suspected terrorists.3  Secretary
Powell also noted that the OAS should continue its work of reviewing hemispheric
security policy, with the goal of developing an inter-American declaration that would
focus on cooperative security efforts and ways to identify, prevent, and remedy
potential threats.
For background information, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America:
Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan; and  “The Americas’ Response to Terrorism,”
on the OAS web site at [http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/crisis_en.htm].
Drug Certification Process and the OAS Multilateral
Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) 
From the mid-1980s to the beginning of FY2001, Congress required the
President to certify that drug producing and drug-transit countries are cooperating
fully with the United States in counter-narcotics efforts in order to avoid a series of
sanctions, including  suspension of U.S. foreign assistance and financing, and
opposition to loans in the multilateral development banks.  During that period, the
sanctions would also apply if Congress, within 30 calendar days, passed a joint
resolution of disapproval to overturn the presidential certification, although any
resolution would be subject to veto.
Over the years, spokesmen from  many countries complained about the
unilateral and non-cooperative nature of the drug certification requirements, and
urged the United States to end the process and to rely upon various multilateral
methods of evaluation developed recently.  Mexico, often the focus of congressional
debate, particularly expressed dissatisfaction with the process, even though it was
regularly certified as being a fully cooperative country.   Following the July 2000
election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox as President of Mexico, a number of
legislative measures were  introduced to modify the drug certification requirements,
and these initiatives were mentioned when President Bush met with President Fox
in Mexico in mid-February 2001, and in the United States in early September 2001.
Acting to soften existing requirements, The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported out S. 219 in April 2001, and S. 1401 (Foreign Relations
Authorization for FY2002-FY2003) with similar language in Sections 741-745, in
August 2001, to modify the drug certification process for 3 years, require designation
of the countries subject to sanctions only, and encourage development of a
multilateral strategy.  Lacking action on these measures,  the drug certification
requirements were temporarily modified in late 2001 by enactment of the Foreign
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Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (H.R. 2506/P.L. 107-115).  This measure
waived the drug certification requirements for FY2002 and required the President to
designate only countries that had demonstrably failed to meet international counter-
narcotics obligations.  On February 25, 2002, President Bush found that three
countries – Afghanistan, Burma, and Haiti – had demonstrably failed to meet
international obligations in this area, but he determined that it was in the national
interest of the United States for Afghanistan (under the new government) and Haiti
to continue to receive U.S. assistance.    The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill
for FY2003 (S. 2779) approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee in July
2002 would extend the provisions of the previous year through FY2003.  
One of the multilateral mechanisms most frequently mentioned is the
Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) developed by the Inter-American Drug
Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States (OAS).
Under the MEM, all hemispheric countries are evaluated on the basis of 61 common
criteria.  Representatives of each country evaluate all countries except their own.
Hemispheric leaders at Summit of the Americas III noted with satisfaction the first
set of evaluations and recommendations under the MEM procedures and called for
strengthening the MEM process and for strengthening hemispheric counter-narcotics
cooperation.  In late January 2002, CICAD reported that hemispheric countries had
made significant progress in implementing CICAD’s initial recommendations.
For more information, see CRS Report RL30892, Drug Certification
Requirements and Proposed Congressional Modifications in 2001-2002; and CRS
Report RL30950, Drug Certification Procedures: A Comparison of Current Law to
S. 219 and S. 1401 as Reported, by K. Larry Storrs.
Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection
Roughly 50% of the world’s tropical forests, 40% of its biological diversity, and
extensive freshwater and marine resources are located in the Latin American and
Caribbean region.   The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has
devoted about $65 million per year to environment programs in the region in recent
years, supporting sustainable forestry, improved hillside agriculture, conservation of
biological diversity, prevention of industrial pollution, and better water management.
In Brazil, for example, USAID, working with other bilateral and multilateral donors
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), supports programs to conserve the
Brazilian rainforest.  The programs’ goals are to suppress fires, and to develop and
train leaders for sustainable development activities that will reduce the extensive
burning/clearing of tropical forests in Brazil’s vast Amazon region which allegedly
contributes to the loss of biological diversity and increased global warming.
For further information, see CRS Report RL30121, Brazil under Cardoso:
Politics, Economics, and Relations with the United States, by K. Larry Storrs; CRS
Report 97-291, NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary E.
Tiemann; and CRS Electronic Briefing Book on “Global Climate Change” on the
CRS web site, [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebgcc1.shtml] as well as
references to Summit of the Americas III above.  See also the explanation of
USAID’s environment programs in Latin America and the Caribbean at USAID’s
web site [http://www.usaid.gov/environment/links.html#lac_usaid].
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II. Mexico
 
Fox Administration in Mexico
Vicente Fox of the conservative Alliance for Change was inaugurated as
President of Mexico on December 1, 2000, for a 6-year term, promising to promote
free market policies, to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, to fight corruption
and crime, and to end the conflictive situation in the state of Chiapas. Fox’s
inauguration ended 71 years of presidential control by the long dominant party in
Mexico.  With no party having a majority in Congress, President Fox has been unable
to advance many aspects of his program.  Congress passed a modified version of the
proposed indigenous rights legislation, prompting the Zapatista rebels in the state of
Chiapas to withdraw from dialogue with the government.  Congress also passed a
patchwork version of the tax and fiscal reforms, significantly reducing the anticipated
resources to be devoted to health and education.  With legislative elections
approaching in 2003 and with each of the major parties having selected new party
leaders in February and March 2002, observers doubt that Fox will be able to obtain
approval of major legislation, including a proposed energy reform that would permit
greater private participation in the hydrocarbon and electricity sectors.  The
President’s relations with the long dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
may be strained by official investigations of the alleged illegal channeling of funds
from the state oil monopoly to the PRI in the 2000 election and of other corrupt
practices and human rights abuses in the past. 
Following economic growth averaging over 5% in 1996-1999 and growth of 7%
in 2000, President Fox had to confront the economic slowdown in the United States,
lower oil prices, and the fallout from the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the first
year of his presidency.  With an economy in which more than 80% of Mexico’s
exports go to the United States, Mexico’s economy contracted 0.8% in 2001 and is
projected to grow modestly (1.4%) in 2002, dependent upon recovery in the United
States.4
President Fox has indicated that Mexico will pursue a more activist and
diversified foreign policy, with greater involvement in UN activities, and stronger
ties to Latin America and Europe.  He has also indicated that it will be more
aggressive in defending the interests of Mexicans living in foreign countries,
particularly those in the United States.  On various occasions, President Fox has
indicated that he expects to have warm and friendly relations with the United States,
and he has called for greater cooperation under NAFTA and for a bilateral migration
agreement that would more adequately deal with safety and labor needs.
Congress has closely followed political and economic developments in Mexico
and is interested in President Fox’s efforts to advance democracy, promote free
market reforms, and resolve the conflictive situation in Chiapas because of the effects
of these developments on bilateral relations and because of the threat of possible
instability on the southern border.
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For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB10070, Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for the 107th Congress, by K. Larry Storrs.
Mexico-U.S. Bilateral Issues 
The United States and Mexico have a special relationship under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which removes trade and investment
barriers between the countries.  The friendly relationship was strengthened in 2001
by President Bush’s meetings with President Fox in mid-February in Mexico, in mid-
April in Canada, and in early May, early September, and early October in the United
States.  President Bush traveled  to Monterrey, Mexico on March 22, 2002, to attend
the International Conference on Financing for Development and to meet with
President Fox to discuss key areas in the bilateral relationship. 
In the bilateral meeting, Presidents Bush and Fox announced a number of
initiatives, including (1) a U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan with greater
cooperation and technological enhancements at the border, (2) a “Partnership for
Prosperity” Action Plan with public-private initiatives to promote domestic and
foreign investment in less developed areas of Mexico with high migration rates, (3)
agreement to seek legislative support to expand the mandate of the North American
Development Bank (NADBank) and the Border Environmental Cooperation
Commission (BECC) to finance environmental infrastructure along the border, and
(4) agreement to continue the cabinet-level talks to achieve safe, legal, and orderly
migration flows between the countries.
 
Congress is acting on a number of broad measures to enhance border security.
In May 2002, the Congress passed and the President signed the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173) to increase INS
investigators and inspectors, require interagency information sharing, mandate
machine-readable visas containing biometric identifiers, strengthen terrorist lookout
systems, and provide better monitoring of foreign students.  On June 6, 2002,
President Bush proposed the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, which
would include Customs, INS, and the Border Patrol.  On July  26, 2002, the House
approved H.R. 5005, generally following the President’s recommendations.  On July
26, 2002, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs approved a measure (S.
2452) giving the President less flexibility in personnel management, and the Senate
is expected to take up this matter in early September 2002.  With regard to drug
certification issues, Congress approved a waiver of the drug certification process for
one year in the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations measure, and the Senate
Appropriations Committee approved S. 2779 in July 2002 that would extend the
waiver through FY2003.  (See discussion above on Drug Certification Process). 
For more information on congressional action on bilateral issues, including
trade, drug trafficking, and migration issues, see CRS Issue Brief IB10070, Mexico-
U.S. Relations: Issues for the 107th Congress; and CRS Report RL31412, Mexico’s
Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Fox, December 2000 to April 2002, by K. Larry
Storrs; as well as CRS Report RL30852, Immigration of Agricultural Guest Workers:
Policy, Trends and Legislative Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and Geoffrey K.
Collver; the section on Border Security in the CRS Electronic Briefing book on
Terrorism, by Lisa Seghetti and William Krouse, which is available online at
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[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter124.html], and the section on NAFTA in
the CRS Electronic Briefing Book on Trade, by J.F. Hornbeck, also available online
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra42.html].
III. Central America and the Caribbean
Disaster Relief and Reconstruction
Following the destruction caused by Hurricane George in the Caribbean and
Hurricane Mitch in Central America in late 1998, the United States responded with
$312 million in emergency relief, and an additional $621 million in grant assistance
through AID and other agencies, funded through the 1999 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act.  Donors and country officials pledged to be better prepared for
disasters, and to “build back better” in reconstruction efforts, including work to
reduce poor conservation and land use practices that often contributed to the severity
of the disaster damage in the countries.  Congress was interested in oversight over
this major project in Central America and the Caribbean, with expenditure of the
designated funding continuing until the end of 2001.  As evidence of continuing
concern, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (H.R. 2506/P.L.
107-115), approved in late 2001, provided in Section 582 that in addition to the $100
million in assistance for El Salvador, not less than $35 million of the funds managed
by the United States Agency for International Development should be made available
for mitigation of the drought and rural food shortages elsewhere in Central America.
For background, see CRS Report 98-1030, Central America: Reconstruction
after Hurricane Mitch, coordinated by Lois McHugh.  For current status, see
USAID’s web site [http://hurricane.info.usaid.gov/].  Also see CRS Report RS21103,
Honduras: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
On January 16, 2002, President Bush announced that the United States would
explore a free trade agreement with the five nations composing the Central American
Common Market (CACM) – Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua.  The five Central American Presidents met in Managua in September
2001 to study ways to create closer economic relations and advance free trade and
expressed their readiness to negotiate free trade with the United States as a region.
The Central American Presidents discussed the free trade agreement with President
Bush during his visit to El Salvador in March 2002.
Integration in Central America has been a historically important theme for the
region although in practice, has experienced setbacks along the way since the CACM
was created in 1960.  Nonetheless, these five nations have banded together in
realization that it is in their best interest to work collectively in negotiating trade
agreements and that the United States, as their largest export market, is the logical
priority.  Although the Central American countries currently qualify as beneficiary
countries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, an FTA with the United States would
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potentially allow for further reduction in trade barriers, make permanent benefits
provisionally guaranteed in legislation requiring periodic reauthorization, and provide
an environment even more conducive for U.S. foreign investment.
For the United States, proponents of the agreement see it supporting U.S.
exports and providing less expensive imports, advancing the movement toward a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and solidifying deeper regional political
and economic reforms that strengthen democracy and promote stability.  Given the
Central American countries’ efforts to sign FTAs with other countries, U.S.
businesses working in the isthmus see a U.S. FTA as an important step toward
rationalizing trade rules in the region.  Since passage of trade promotion authority
(TPA) legislation, the United States seems prepared to move ahead expeditiously, but
an announcement of the start of formal negotiations has yet to be made.
For further information, see “Fact Sheet U.S.-Central America Free Trade
Agreement,” January 16, 2002, available online at the White House web site
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020116-11.html].
Earthquakes in El Salvador
El Salvador experienced several major earthquakes in January and February
2001 that killed over one thousand people, and displaced nearly two million people.
The United States and other countries have responded with emergency and relief
assistance.  U.S. emergency assistance totaled nearly $10 million by mid-February
2001, with $6.1 million provided in response to the mid-January earthquake, and $3.3
million in response to the mid-February earthquake. When President Bush met with
Salvadoran President Francisco Flores in early March 2001, he said that the United
States had provided over $16 million in emergency relief assistance, and he pledged
to provide $52 million in reconstruction assistance in FY2001, and an equal or
greater amount in FY2002.  He also notified the Salvadoran President of the U.S.
Attorney General’s decision to grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to
Salvadoran immigrants in the United States for a period of 18 months.  The
Salvadoran government had expressed concern about the additional strain that
returned immigrants would place on already stretched resources.  The Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (H.R. 2506/P.L. 107-115), approved in
late 2001, provides in Section 582 that not less than $100 million in rehabilitation
and reconstruction assistance will be provided to El Salvador.
When President Bush visited El Salvador on March 24, 2002, he discussed with
President Flores the country’s efforts to strengthen democracy, modernize the
economy, and deal with earthquake reconstruction. 
For background, see CRS Report 98-1030, Central America: Reconstruction
after Hurricane Mitch, coordinated by Lois McHugh.  For current status, see
USAID’s updates on the earthquake in El Salvador, available online at
[http://www.usaid.gov/sv/earthq/main.htm].
CRS-10
Guatemala and the Peace Accords  
Guatemala is beginning the sixth year of implementation of the historic peace
accords signed in December 1996, which called for programs to transform Guatemala
into a more participatory and equitable society.  The United States is the single
largest bilateral donor in this area, having offered $260 million in support over the
four-year period from 1997 to 2000.  Additional support was pledged through
FY2003, although multilateral institutions are making larger contributions.  The Bush
Administration allocated  $27.6 million in development assistance and $10 million
in Economic Support Funds in FY2002 assistance and is requesting $26.7 million in
Development Assistance and $7.5 million in Economic Support Funds for FY2003,
largely to support the peace process.  U.S. assistance helps the Guatemalan
government to implement its social reform program, modernize the justice sector,
carry out land bank and titling programs, and encourage participation from marginal
communities.  The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (H.R.
2506/P.L. 107-115), approved in late 2001, provides in Section 577 for U.S. agencies
to collect, expeditiously declassify, and to make public any information on the
murders of U.S. citizens in Guatemala since December 1999.  The section in the Act
on International Military Education and Training (IMET) stipulates that funds for
Guatemala may only be provided for expanded IMET, or training for civilians, and
only through regular notification procedures to the Committees on Appropriations.
For background, see CRS Report 98-1030, Central America: Reconstruction
after Hurricane Mitch, coordinated by Lois McHugh.  For current status, see
USAID’s reports on Guatemala [http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/bj2001/lac/gt/].
Nicaragua
Ongoing congressional concerns regarding Nicaragua include resolution of
property claims, U.S. assistance to Nicaragua, human rights conditions, and
democratization issues such as elections and anti-corruption efforts.  Resolution of
property claims by U.S. citizens regarding expropriations carried out by the
Sandinista government in the 1980s remains the most contentious area in U.S.-
Nicaraguan relations.  After a 3-year freeze in property-related lawsuits, new property
tribunals began hearing cases in July 2000.  According to the State Department’s
most recent Human Rights Report (released March 4, 2002), 317 cases had been
filed, 184 passed through the mediation process, and 40 cases (22%) were settled as
of July  2001. Those cases not mediated move on to arbitration, or are returned to
district courts for expedited trials.  U.S. technical assistance is aimed at improving
the mechanism for settling property disputes.
The Bush Administration requested $35.9 million for Nicaragua in FY2002 and
$37.6 million in FY2003, including about $10 million in food aid for each year.  U.S.
law prohibits aid to countries that have confiscated assets of U.S. citizens, but U.S.
administrations have granted annual waivers to allow Nicaragua to receive aid.
Nicaragua is the second poorest nation in the hemisphere.  Its population of 5 million
has a per capita income of  only $430 per year.  About half the population lives in
poverty, with 17% living in extreme poverty.  The fall in world coffee prices have
left many growers and pickers without money to buy food or crop seeds.
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Nicaraguans have begun dying of malnutrition, according to Nicaraguan human
rights officials, who predict that more Nicaraguans will starve to death unless
immediate food aid is made available.5
The government of Nicaragua “generally respected many of its citizens’ human
rights,”according to the State Department Human Rights Report, but serious
problems remain, such as extrajudicial killings by security forces.  A certain amount
of impunity persists, although the government has  effectively punished some human
rights offenders.
In the first session of the 107th Congress, an additional concern was the fairness
and outcome of national elections held on November 4, 2001.  The top two
presidential candidates were former President Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) and Enrique Bolaños of the incumbent Liberal
Constitutional party.  Bush Administration officials made it clear they were
concerned about an Ortega victory because from 1979 to1990, Ortega headed
Sandinista governments that were socialist and pro-Soviet and fought a civil war
against U.S.-backed “contras.”  Bolaños, a businessman whose property was
confiscated during the Sandinista era, won the election, which was widely regarded
as free and fair, and he was inaugurated January 10, 2002.  
Under Nicaraguan law, Ortega retains a seat in the National Assembly as the
runner-up presidential candidate.  Also in the legislature is former President Arnoldo
Aleman, who negotiated an automatic seat for himself at his term’s end.  As
perceptions of corruption in the Aleman Administration rose during the campaign,
Bolaños, his former Vice President, distanced himself from the then-President,
denouncing the January 2000 agreement between Aleman and Ortega on
constitutional changes that have been criticized as helping the latter two maintain a
hold on power. 
Following through on his pledge to attack corruption, Bolaños’ administration
filed charges in April 2002 against former President Aleman and seven other officials
for alleged misuse of $1.3 million in state funds and in August for laundering of $10
million.  Nicaragua’s Attorney General has accused Aleman of laundering and
misusing about $96 million in government funds while he was in office, an amount
equal to 4% of Nicaragua’s GDP, or an entire year’s national health budget.6
Aleman’s seat in the legislature brings with it immunity from prosecution, which he
has said he will not voluntarily relinquish.  President Bolaños publicly called on the
legislature to strip Aleman of his parliamentary immunity.  National Assembly
leaders have reportedly agreed to begin negotiations to do so.  The stepdaughter of
Daniel Ortega has again asked that the government investigate her charges that the
former President raped her.  Zoilamerica Narvaez first charged four years ago that
Ortega raped her repeatedly over several years, beginning when she was about 11
years old, about the time the Sandinistas took power in 1979.
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Aleman, in apparent retaliation for the corruption campaign against him, is
using his position as leader of the legislature, with control of a narrow majority, to
paralyze the government.  He blocked congressional approval of the budget and tax
reforms needed to qualify for an IMF loan the Bolaños Administration had hoped to
secure this summer.  Some analysts fear this could lead to Nicaragua defaulting on
its foreign debt.  Aleman also blocked an earlier attempt to lift his immunity.  
Bolaños and the other Central American Presidents met with President Bush in
March 2002 to discuss establishing a Central American-U.S. free trade agreement.
Bolaños made a private working visit to Washington in early April 2002, meeting
with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Otto Reich and
Inter-American Development Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials.
Bolaños outlined education and health as his administration’s top priorities for his
poverty-stricken nation, one of the poorest in the hemisphere.  The Bush
Administration supports his anti-corruption drive: Assistant Secretary Reich visited
Nicaragua in August, signing an agreement to provide $1.8 million of U.S. assistance
“to strengthen democracy and eliminate corruption.”  And U.S. Ambassador Oliver
Garza reportedly said the United States was investigating Aleman’s international
accounts and money flows and could charge Aleman with money laundering in U.S.
courts.7
Reich also urged Nicaragua and Honduras to resolve their border dispute, which
began in 1999 when Honduras ratified a sea border treaty with Colombia that ignored
Nicaraguan claims to over 50,000 square miles of Caribbean territorial waters.
Honduran President Ricardo Maduro said the two countries could not find an
international mediator to help resolve the dispute.
For further information, see CRS Report RS20983, Nicaragua: Country Brief,
by Maureen Taft-Morales.
Caribbean “Third Border Initiative”  
At the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec, Canada, President Bush
announced the “Third Border Initiative” for the Caribbean region.  According to the
Administration, the initiative aims to deepen U.S. commitment to fighting the spread
of HIV/AIDS, to respond to natural disasters, and to make sure the benefits of
globalization are felt in even the smallest economies, particularly those in the
Caribbean, which can be seen as a “third border” of the United States.  The initiatives
in the “Third Border Initiative” include $20 million in FY2002 HIV/AIDS funding,
establishment of a teacher training “Center for Excellence,” increased funding for
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation, assistance to improve regional civil aviation
oversight, and additional funding for anti-corruption and anti-money laundering law
enforcement efforts.  
The AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean – where the infection rates in several
countries are among the highest outside of sub-Saharan Africa – has already begun
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to have negative consequences for economic and social development in the region.
The countries in the Caribbean with the highest infection rates are Haiti and the
Bahamas, with adult infection rates over 4%; Guyana, with an infection rate of about
3%; and the Dominican Republic and Belize, with infection rates over 2%. The U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) has been the main U.S. agency
providing support for a variety of regional and bilateral programs to combat AIDS
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Overall USAID funding to combat
HIV/AIDS in the Latin America and Caribbean region rose from $15.8 million in
FY2000 to $33.2 million in FY2002.  For these two years, funding for Caribbean
nations rose from $5.8 million in FY2000 to $15.8 million in FY2002.  In June 2002,
President Bush announced a new program targeted at reducing mother-to-child
transmission of HIV/AIDS in the Caribbean and Africa.  In the Caribbean, the new
program will include bilateral efforts in Guyana and Haiti and regional efforts
through the Caribbean Regional Epidemiological Center.8  
In addition to USAID, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
has a number of programs to help combat HIV/AIDS in developing countries.   In
April 2002, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson signed a “Pan-Caribbean Partnership
Agreement” in Guyana intended to expand the reach of HHS cooperative programs
for the Caribbean.9
For more information on the “Third Border Initiative,” see the U.S. Department
of State, Washington File, Fact Sheet: Caribbean “Third Border Initiative” on the
State Department Web site [http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/summit/factb.htm].
Also see CRS Report RS21166, AIDS in the Caribbean and Central America, by
Mark P. Sullivan.
Cuba
Cuba, a hard-line Communist state with a poor record on human rights, has been
led by Fidel Castro since the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Since the early 1960s, U.S.
policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through
comprehensive economic sanctions. These were made stronger with the Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
in 1996, often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation.  Another component of
U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, including private
humanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to
Cuba. 
Under U.S. sanctions, commercial medical and food exports to Cuba are
allowed but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements.  The 106th
Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000
(P.L. 106-387, Title IX) that allows for one-year export licenses for shipping food
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and medicine to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance, foreign assistance,
export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance such exports.
The law, furthermore, denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing
or credit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing
from third countries.  Since November2001, Cuba has purchased over $90 million
in agricultural products from U.S. companies.
Although President Bush has announced stronger measures to enforce the
embargo, he also has continued in the same vein as the Clinton Administration by
suspending implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton legislation.  On July 13,
2001, President Bush asked the Treasury Department to enhance and expand the
enforcement capabilities of the Office of Foreign Assets Control.  The President
noted the importance of upholding and enforcing the law in order to prevent
“unlicensed and excessive travel,” enforce limits on remittances, and ensure that
humanitarian and cultural exchanges actually reach pro-democracy activists in Cuba.
Just three days later, on July 16, 2001, President Bush decided to continue to suspend
for a 6-month period the Title III provisions of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act (P.L. 104-114) that allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages
in U.S. federal court those persons who traffic in property confiscated in Cuba.   He
cited efforts by European countries and other U.S. allies to push for democratic
change in Cuba. Since then, President Bush has continued to suspend the right to file
lawsuits under Title III at six-month intervals, most recently on July 16, 2002.
On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced a new initiative on Cuba that
includes four measures designed to reach out to the Cuban people: (1) facilitating
humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people by U.S. religious and other non-
governmental organization (NGOs); (2) providing direct assistance to the Cuban
people through NGOs; (3) calling for the resumption of direct mail service to and
from Cuba; and (4) establishing scholarships in the United States for Cuban students
and professionals involved in building civil institutions and for family members of
political prisoners.  President Bush also called on Cuba to take steps to ensure that
the 2003 National Assembly elections are free and fair and to adopt meaningful
market-based reforms.  If those conditions were met, the President maintained that
he would work with Congress to ease the ban on trade and travel.  However, the
President maintained that full normalization of relations (diplomatic recognition,
open trade, and a robust aid program) would only occur when Cuba has a fully
democratic government, when the rule of law is respected, and when the human
rights of all Cubans are fully protected.  The President’s initiative did not include an
explicit tightening of restrictions on travel to Cuba that some observers had expected.
The President, did state, however, that the United States would “continue to enforce
economic sanctions on Cuba, and the ban on travel to Cuba, until Cuba’s government
proves that it is committed to real reform.”10
Although there appears to be broad agreement in Congress on the overall
objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba — to help bring democracy and respect for
human rights to the island – there have been several schools of thought on how to
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achieve that objective.  Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressure on the
Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts
to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as
constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are
hurting the Cuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others
call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. 
Legislative initiatives introduced in the 107th Congress reflect these divergent
views on the direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba (whether sanctions should be
eased or intensified) and also cover a range of issues including human rights, drug
interdiction cooperation, and broadcasting to Cuba.  On July 25, 2001, in action on
the Treasury Department Appropriations for FY2002 (H.R. 2590), the House
approved an amendment that would prohibit the Treasury Department from using
funds to enforce restrictions on travel to Cuba, but it rejected another amendment that
would prohibit enforcement of the overall economic embargo.  The Senate version
of the bill did not include the travel provision, and ultimately it was not included in
the conference report to the bill. 
In the second session of the 107th Congress, the Senate version of the “Farm
Bill,” H.R. 2646, included a provision that would strike language from U.S. law that
prohibits private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba.  Although the House version
of the bill did not contain the financing provision, on April 23, 2002, the House
approved (273-143) a nonbinding motion offered by Representative Calvin Dooley
to instruct the conferees to accept the Senate provision. Ultimately, however, the
conference report to the bill (H.Rept. 107-424, filed May 1, 2002) did not include the
Senate financing provision.  
During July 23, 2002 consideration of the FY2003 Treasury Department
appropriations measure, H.R. 5120, the House approved three Cuba sanctions
amendments that would ease restrictions on travel, remittances, and agricultural
sales.  The Senate version of the bill, S. 2740, as reported out of committee, includes
a provision that would prevent funds from being used to enforce Cuba travel
restrictions. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of the Treasury Paul
O’Neill have said that they would recommend that the President veto legislation that
eases restrictions on travel and on the financing of agricultural exports to Cuba.  The
White House has also stated that President Bush would veto such legislation.
For further information, see CRS Report RL30806, Cuba: Issues for the 107th
Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan and Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS Report RL31139,
Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Legislative Initiatives in the 107th Congress,
by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and Agriculture
Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation, by Remy
Jurenas.
Haiti
Former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was inaugurated on February 7, 2001
to a second, non-consecutive term.  Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party swept
presidential and legislative elections on November 26, 2000.  All of the major
opposition parties boycotted the elections, however, citing widespread fraud by
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Aristide supporters and the unresolved dispute over May 2000 legislative elections.
Also on February 7, a coalition of 15 political parties, the Convergence
Democratique, formed an alternative government and repeated its call for new
elections. More than a year and a half after Aristide took office, the dispute remains
unresolved, and violence and human rights violations have increased.  Violent
protests have erupted around the country, with reports of increased calls for
Aristide’s removal among Haiti’s poor, usually considered Aristide’s core supporters.
The Organization of American States (OAS) has remained frustrated in its
repeated attempts to mediate a resolution to the political crisis. The OAS conducted
an independent investigation into the December 2001 attack on the presidential
palace and the violence against opposition parties and leaders that followed.  Its July
report stated that the attack was not a coup attempt, as the Aristide administration had
claimed; that the political opposition did not plan or execute the attack; and that
government and Lavalas party officials armed militants who plundered and burned
the homes and offices of opposition members following the palace attack. 
The United States and other international donors have said they will not provide
aid to the Haitian government until Aristide carries out pledges he made in December
2000 to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms, including correcting
the problems of the May elections, in which Aristide supporters were awarded 10
disputed Senate seats.  Foreign assistance to Haiti continues but is currently provided
mostly through non-governmental organizations. At the Summit of the Americas on
April 22, 2001, hemispheric heads of state singled out Haiti as a country whose
problems are limiting its democratic and other development, and urged President
Aristide to carry through on his pledges to reform. 
In the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115, signed
into law Jan.10, 2002), Section 520 prohibits providing assistance to Haiti except
through regular notification procedures to the Committees on Appropriations. No
other conditions on aid to Haiti are in the Act. Section 554 allows the Haitian
government to purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard.
USAID currently provides humanitarian assistance to Haiti only through non-
governmental organizations and will probably only provide direct assistance to the
government once it makes the reforms it has promised, including resolving the
disputed elections.
H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002 and 2003
(passed by the House May 16, 2001) would authorize $6,000 to the Organization of
American States for each fiscal year to be appropriated only for the investigation and
dissemination of information on violations of freedom of expression by the
government of Haiti. The Senate version, passed on May 1, 2002, with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, contains no such provision.  The Senate
insisted on its amendment, and the bill is in conference.
In February 2002, President Bush notified Congress that Haiti was among three
nations that “failed demonstrably to make substantial counter narcotics efforts over
the past 12 months.”  The Administration exercised a waiver, however, saying that
continued aid to Haiti was vital to national interests.
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The Department of State reported that the Haitian government’s “generally poor
human rights record worsened” in 2001, with the government continuing to commit
serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings by members of the
Haitian National Police (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 4,
2002).
For further information see CRS Issue Brief IB96019, Haiti: Issues for
Congress, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
IV.  Andean Region
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI)  
In April and May 2001, the Bush Administration proposed $882.29 million in
FY2002 economic and counter-narcotics assistance, as well as extension of trade
preferences and other measures, for Colombia and regional neighbors in an initiative
called the “Andean Regional Initiative” (ARI). 
Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argued that it overemphasized military
and counter-drug assistance and provided inadequate support for human rights and
the peace process in Colombia.  Supporters argued that it continued needed
assistance to Colombia while providing more support for regional neighbors and
social and economic programs.
In action on the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 2506),
the House passed the bill on July 24, 2001, with $826 million for the ARI, of which
$675 million was for the counter-narcotics “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” (ACI)
portion, a reduction of $56 million from the President’s ACI request.  The Senate
passed the bill on October 24, 2001, with $698 million for the ARI, of which $547
million was for the ACI, a reduction of $184 million from the President’s ACI
request.  The conference version of H.R. 2506, as approved by the House on
December 19 and the Senate on December 20, included $625 million for the ACI,
$106 million less than the President’s ACI request, with $215 million earmarked for
AID programs.  The measure included a variety of conditions relating to human
rights and aerial fumigation as well as an alteration of the cap on military and civilian
contractors serving in Colombia.  In February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush
Administration allocated $645 million to the ACI account for FY2002, including $20
million transferred from the general International Narcotics Control account.
In February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush Administration requested a total
of $979.8 million in Andean Regional Initiative assistance for FY2003, including
$731 million in counter-narcotics Andean Counterdrug Initiative assistance for the
seven ARI countries, and $98 million in Foreign Military Financing for Colombia to
train and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline in northern
Colombia.
In March 2002, the Bush Administration’s Emergency FY2002 Supplemental
for counter-terrorism included a request for $4 million of INC funding for Colombia
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police post support,  $6 million of FMF funding for counter-terrorism equipment and
training in Colombia and $3 million of FMF funding for Ecuador for similar
purposes, and $25 million of Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining
funding for counter-kidnapping training in Colombia.  Also included in the
submission were requests to broaden the authorities of the Defense and State
Departments to use FY2002, FY2003 assistance and unexpended Plan Colombia aid
to support the Colombian government’s “unified campaign against narcotics
trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security.”  Proponents
of the Administration’s requests argue that, in the context of the global war on
terrorism, that Colombia and the region should be supported at this time with
counter-terrorism assistance before Colombia’s violence worsens and endangers
other countries, particularly when leftist guerrillas have demonstrated little
willingness to achieve peace.  Critics argue that counter-insurgency and anti-
terrorism assistance would thrust the United States into Colombia’s  major guerrilla
conflict on the side of armed forces with links to rightist groups guilty of gross
human rights abuse.
In legislative action in 2002, Congress passed two major measures in the
summer, and is making progress on a third measure.  The FY2002 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775) was approved in July 2002, with
expanded authorities in Colombia under human rights conditions, and it was signed
into law (P.L. 107-206) on August 2, 2002.  The Andean Trade Preference Act
(ATPA) extension and broadening was approved in July 2002 as part of an omnibus
trade bill (H.R. 3009) including trade promotion authority and trade adjustment
assistance, and the President signed it into law (P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002.
The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2003 Foreign
Operations Appropriation (S. 2779) in July 2002, with a cut of $94 million in the
President’s Andean Counterdrug Initiative and with numerous required certifications
and reports on human rights conditions and the safety of aerial fumigation programs.
For information on FY2002 assistance, see CRS Report RL31016, Andean
Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K.
Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino.  For information on FY2002 supplemental and
FY2003 assistance, see CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K.
Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino.  See also material available under Plan Colombia
on the U.S. Department of State’s International Information Programs Internet site
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)
Following passage by the 102nd Congress, President George Bush signed into
law the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) on December 4, 1991 (P.L. 102-182,
Title II), making it part of a multifaceted strategy to counter illicit drug production
and promote trade in Latin America.  For 10 years, it provided preferential, mostly
duty-free, treatment of selected U.S. imports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru.  ATPA’s goal was to encourage growth of a more diversified Andean export
base, thereby promoting development and providing an incentive for Andean farmers
and other workers to pursue economic alternatives to the drug trade.  ATPA expired
on December 4, 2001.  Following a lengthy debate, the 107th Congress reauthorized
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the program (retroactively) and expanded it in the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act (ATPDEA), Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002 (H.R. 3009),
which was signed into law (P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002, by President George
W. Bush.
Prior to expiring, ATPA’s trade preferences provided a small incentive-based
part to a larger Andean counternarcotics strategy.  Coca production was the primary
target of these efforts and, because coca has been a highly profitable undertaking, a
key element of the counternarcotics strategy is supporting the cultivation of
alternative cash crops.  ATPA’s supporters argued before Congress that reduced
tariffs played a part of the “alternative development” strategy by providing an
additional financial incentive to substitute legal crops (asparagus has been one
success story) for coca cultivation.  The increase in non-agricultural exports (e.g.,
copper cathodes) also may reflect the effects of this preferential tariff program.
Others noted that through the life of the program, ATPA’s benefits were
quantitatively small, in part because they did not affect a large portion of Andean
exports.  Many Andean exports were either ineligible under ATPA or were eligible
for preferential treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as well.
The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) determined that if these
two groups of Andean exports were excluded, those articles that entered the United
States exclusively under the ATPA provisions (that is would not be eligible under the
GSP in the absence of ATPA) would amount to only 10% of exports from the
beneficiary countries.  This did not change for 10 years, suggesting that ATPA’s
trade effects were unlikely to increase, unless the program’s parameters could be
modified.
Supporters of the ATPA program proposed that it be reauthorized to reinforce
the U.S. commitment to the alternative development counternarcotics strategy and
that benefits be extended to additional Andean exports to broaden their effects.
Opponents raised concerns over the adverse impact its reduced tariffs would have on
U.S. domestic producers.  There was also interest in trying to rationalize treatment
among countries in the region that were provided preferential treatment under
different trade arrangements such as ATPA, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).
On December 4, 2001, ATPA expired and U.S. tariffs were reimposed on
affected Andean exports.  On February 15, 2002, the Bush Administration deferred
collection of these tariffs for 90 days in expectation that the 107th Congress would
either reauthorize ATPA or provide a short-term extension of its trade preferences.
In part because the ATPA legislation was eventually linked to the larger debate on
trade promotion authority (TPA), Congress was unable to complete work on the bill
before the deferral expired.  The program was eventually reauthorized in the Andean
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), Title XXXI of the Trade Act
of 2002 (H.R. 3009), which was signed into law by President Bush on August 6,
2002 (P.L. 107-210).  All duty reductions that were in place prior to ATPA’s
expiration were made retroactive to December 4, 2001 and presumably all those
duties collected are reimbursable.
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As passed into law, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
reflects the findings of the 107th Congress that extending and expanding trade
preferences to beneficiary countries is part of an effective U.S. foreign policy to
counter illicit drug trafficking from the Andean region.  To enhance the effects of the
expired ATPA, it extends preferential treatment through December 31, 2006, and
expands it to cover many Andean exports previously excluded, such as certain textile
and apparel articles, footwear, leather products, petroleum, watches, and canned tuna.
In general, the provisions provide treatment similar to that received by Caribbean
countries under the Caribbean Basin Trade Promotion Act (CBTPA) and incorporates
customs procedures, including more relaxed certificate of origin rules, similar to
those found in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  ATPDEA also
tightens transshipment and safeguard provisions to address concerns of U.S. textile
and apparel manufacturers.
For further reading, see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference
Act: Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by J. F. Hornbeck.
Colombia
In a marked departure from recent policy, President Bush sought, through the
FY2003 annual budget request and the FY2002 supplemental appropriations request,
to expand the scope of U.S. assistance, particularly military assistance, to Colombia.
Until the FY2002 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 4775, P.L. 107-206) was
signed into law on August 2, 2002, U.S. policy permitted funding, particularly for
Colombia’s security forces, almost exclusively for counternarcotics and related
programs.  In the supplemental request, submitted March 21, 2002, the Bush
Administration sought authority that would allow State and Defense department
funds to be used to assist the Colombian government counter any threat to its national
security.  More specifically, it would allow FY2002 and FY2003 assistance and
unexpended Plan Colombia FY2000 supplemental assistance to support the
Colombian government’s “unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist
activities, and other threats to its national security.”  Congress granted this authority
for FY2002 for the use of both Department of Defense (DOD) and State Department
International Narcotics Control funds, in passing the FY2002 supplemental.  In the
statement of the managers accompanying the conference report on the bill (H.Rept.
107-593), the managers stated that they expect that expanded authorities will
continue into 2003 unless Colombia fails to make a good faith effort to fulfill
commitments required by the bill and intend for authorities to continue in any
continuing resolutions.  Congress must re-authorize such support in FY2003
legislation, however.  As of August 2002, none of the relevant authorization or
appropriations measures contained that re-authorization. 
The Bush Administration’s request to enlarge U.S. policy towards Colombia
renewed debate over the appropriate level and type of U.S. assistance, particularly
military assistance, to Colombia.  Current policy, including strict human rights
provisions, derives from the Clinton Administration’s “Plan Colombia”  legislation
(P.L. 106-246). In July 2000, Congress approved $1.2 billion in regular and
supplemental  FY2000 and FY2001 appropriations for “Plan Colombia” and
previously funded  programs in Colombia. Nearly half of the $860.3 million “Plan
Colombia” supplemental funds from P.L. 106-246 was requested for a “Push into
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Southern Colombia” program to set up and train two new Colombian Army
Counternarcotics Battalions (CACBs), which combined with an existing one set up
earlier by the United States.  The new battalions were to assist the Colombian
National Police (CNP) in the fumigation of illicit narcotics crops and the dismantling
of laboratories, beginning with coca fumigation in the southern provinces of
Putumayo and Caquetá, where coca cultivation was spreading rapidly. The rationale
for the program was to debilitate Colombia’s powerful leftist  guerrillas by depriving
them of the substantial  income they derive from taxing narcotics cultivation,
processing, and marketing.  In addition, Congress also provided substantial assistance
for economic development, displaced persons, human rights monitors, and
administration of justice and other governance programs, all intended to help
Colombia counter the many threats to its stability and integrity from the trafficking
of illegal narcotics.
President Bush and proponents of expanded military aid now hold that such
assistance is necessary to shore up Colombia’s beleaguered democracy.  Such
assistance, however,  revived some Members’ concerns that the United States is
being slowly drawn into a Vietnam-like morass, providing assistance to a
government that does not have the credibility and political will to successfully wage
its own war and conclude with a just peace.  Of particular concern to opponents have
been  the human rights provisions in the Plan Colombia and subsequent legislation,
not all of which would continue to apply under the Bush proposal.  The FY2002
supplemental appropriations bill continues all previous or similar conditions from the
FY2002 foreign operations appropriations act (P.L. 107-115) and the FY2002
defense appropriations acts (P.L. 107-117). 
The Administration also requested additional funding to help Colombia face its
multidimensional security threats, totaling $572 million in FY2002 supplemental and
FY2003 regular budget funds.  In the FY2003 budget request, the President asked for
$98 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid to fund units of Colombian
soldiers to protect an oil pipeline and other infrastructure frequently sabotaged by
leftist guerrilla groups.   For counternarcotics activities, $ 439 million was requested
under the FY2003 budget request’s State Department’s INC account for continued
support of “Plan Colombia” programs and for the formation of a new Colombian
Army counternarcotics brigade of about 2,700 troops.   Action on these requests is
still pending.  According to State Department sources, Congress did fully fund the
$35 million  FY2002 supplemental request for Colombia, which included $25 million
in anti-terrorism funds for an anti-kidnapping program for Colombian police and
military forces; $6 million in FMF funds to initiate the infrastructure security
program in FY2002; and $4 million in State Department International Narcotics
Control (INC) funds to help the Colombian National Police establish posts in areas
now lacking a government security presence.  The bill modifies some existing
reporting requirements and adds new ones.
The U.S.-backed spray eradication of coca crops has also caused considerable
controversy.  Many groups have lobbied for a cessation of all spraying until alleged
ill health effects are investigated and all those whose legal subsistence crops could
be affected by the spraying are given the opportunity to join voluntary eradication and
well-supported alternative development efforts. P.L. 107-115 requires the Secretary
of State to report, before funds from that act can be used to purchase chemicals for
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fumigation spraying, that such fumigation is being carried out under EPA regulatory
controls applicable in the United States, that the chemicals and their manner of
application do not pose unreasonable risks to or result in adverse effects on people
or the environment, that the spray is in accordance with Colombian law, and that
compensation procedures are in place for damages.  As of August 2002, this report
had not been submitted.  Spraying was suspended for some months in 2001 and early
2002  in “Plan Colombia” target provinces of Putumayo and Caquetá for a variety of
reasons but resumed with funding from previous years.
 As of mid-2002, the Bush Administration had allocated $380.5 million from
P.L. 107-115, all from the INC, for Colombia. Another $92.2 million has been
tentatively allocated for counternarcotics programs in Colombia from the FY2002
defense appropriations counternarcotics account.  The State Department had also
allocated some $41.8 million worth of aid for aerial spray eradication from the State
Department’s INC air wing account. 
As passed by the House on May 10, H.R. 4546, the National Defense
Authorization bill for FY2003, contains a provision capping the number of DOD-
funded U.S. military personnel involved in operations in Colombia at 500.  The bill
would  allow the Secretary of Defense to waive the cap for national security reasons.
The Senate version of the bill, S. 2515, has no corresponding provision.   
For more information, see CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative
(ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors,
which tracks action during 2002 on Colombia; CRS Report RL30541,Colombia:
Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001) for information on
legislation approved in 2000, CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative
(ARI): FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, which tracked action during
2001, and CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe Administration and
Congressional Concerns, which provides information on the Colombian
administration that took power August 7, 2002.
Peru
Alejandro Toledo was inaugurated as President of Peru on July 28, 2001,
following two-round presidential elections in April and June 2001 that were widely
regarded as free and fair.  Toledo’s primary tasks are seen as stimulating economic
growth, maintaining stability, and restoring the independence of democratic
institutions – and public confidence in them –  by continuing to root out the
widespread political corruption that is part of the legacy left behind by President
Alberto Fujimori.  The former Executive fled to Japan and resigned in November
2000, following allegations of electoral fraud and a series of corruption and human
rights scandals involving his top aide.  An interim government was formed according
to constitutional rules of succession and was praised for maintaining calm, attacking
corruption, and organizing presidential and legislative elections in its eight months
in office. An anti-Fujimori opposition leader, Toledo was elected with 53% of the
valid vote, against left-leaning former Peruvian President Alan Garcia with 47% of
the vote. Toledo has called for elections for new regional governments in November
2002.
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Since taking office, Toledo has been widely criticized as having weak leadership
skills and for making promises he cannot keep.  Frustrated that Toledo has been
unable to generate jobs or stimulate an economy that has been stagnant for four years,
Peruvians have been staging frequent protests around the country.  A nation-wide
strike shut down half the country in May 2002.  Toledo pleads for patience, and says
he cannot be expected to deliver in the short-term what he committed to deliver over
five years.  Peruvian and Wall Street analysts said that the Toledo Administration’s
“prudent” 2002 budget, ambitious privatization plan, and agreement for a new
standby loan from the International Monetary Fund were creating conditions for
growth.  In the face of public protests against privatization and other aspects of his
economic policy, however, Toledo fired his Finance Minister, the internationally
respected economist Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, replacing him with Javier Silva Ruete,
who held the post during the interim government.
Since the fall of the Fujimori government, many observers have expressed
concern regarding the former head of the Peruvian intelligence service, Vladimiro
Montesinos, and his relationship to U.S. agencies, especially the Central Intelligence
Agency, and to counter narcotics operations.  Montesinos also fled, was captured in
Venezuela and returned to Peru, where he faces some 168 criminal investigations
into crimes including money laundering, illicit enrichment and corruption, organizing
death squads, protecting drug lords, and illegal arms trafficking. In their oversight of
counter narcotics programs in Peru, Members of the 107th Congress continue to
monitor these investigations, especially as they relate to relations between
Montesinos and U.S. agencies.  The United States has provided the Peruvian
congressional committee investigating Montesinos’ activities with declassified State
Department documents, which show U.S. officials as wary of dealing with
Montesinos in light of unconfirmed allegations of his involvement in corruption and
human rights violations.  In July 2002 Montesinos was convicted of usurping office,
the first of over 70 criminal charges he faces.  In August the Swiss government
repatriated some $78 million from Montesinos’ Swiss bank accounts to the
government of Peru.
Congressional support for a U.S.-Peruvian aerial drug interdiction program
waned following an accident on April 20, 2001, in which an American missionary
plane was accidentally shot down in Peru, killing a U.S. missionary woman and her
infant daughter.  The program, which involves intelligence sharing between Central
Intelligence Agency-contracted private military personnel and Peruvian authorities,
has been suspended and under review.  Peru’s Foreign Minister at the time reportedly
asked that the program be resumed, arguing that it is the only practical way to combat
narcotics traffickers in Peru.  Others argue that the flight interdiction program’s
impact is minimal because traffickers use a variety of other means to export coca
from Peru. The U.S. and Peruvian governments conducted a joint investigation into
the accident. Their report, released August 2, 2001, concluded that lax procedures,
including the inability of Peruvian and U.S. personnel to communicate in the same
language, contributed to the erroneous shoot down. According to the State
Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL),
a Letter of Agreement outlining new procedures is being drafted, Peruvian crews
began training in July 2002, and the target date for resumption of aerial interdiction
is November 2002.
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The Andean Counterdrug Initiative, incorporated into the Foreign Operations
appropriations bill for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115, signed into law Jan.10, 2002),
prohibits funding of a Peruvian air interdiction program until the Secretary of State
and Director of Central Intelligence certify to Congress, 30 days before resuming
such a program, that enhanced safeguards and procedures are in place to prevent the
occurrence of any incident similar to the one of April  2001. It also sets forth health
and safety guidelines for aerial coca fumigation and specifies that not less than $215
million shall be applied to USAID economic and social programs in the Andean
region.  U.S. Ambassador to Peru John Hamilton said U.S. counter narcotics
assistance to Peru would triple in 2002 to over $150 million.  Of that aid, $77.5
million is for alternative development programs, and $75 million is for law
enforcement, interdiction, and eradication operations.  In July Peru’s government
abruptly halted forced eradication of coca and suspended crop substitution programs,
although according to the State Department’s INL, eradication will resume this year.
In March 2002, the United States and Peru signed a Bilateral Peru Riverine Plan
to increase joint police and naval operations against narcotics traffickers on Peru’s
rivers.  The government of Peru is to maintain a regional Riverine Training School,
and the United States will provide $3 million in annual support of river operations
and maintenance programs.11
Members of Congress have also expressed concern regarding the case of Lori
Berenson, an American jailed in Peru. Berenson was convicted in 1996 by a secret
military tribunal of helping plan a thwarted attack against the legislature by the Tupac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), a guerrilla group, and she was given a life
sentence.  In 2000, a higher military tribunal overturned the ruling and sent the case
to a civilian anti-terrorism court, which in June 2001 convicted Berenson on charges
of collaboration with terrorists, reducing her sentence to 20 years, including time
already served.  Berenson’s appeal was denied by Peru’s Supreme Court in February
2002.  In July 2001, 143 Members of Congress signed a letter to the Peruvian
government asking for the immediate release of Berenson, who maintains her
innocence.  Reportedly, both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell
asked Toledo for her release on humanitarian grounds (Miami Herald, February 19,
2002). Others, including former U.S. Ambassador to Peru Dennis Jett, who was
serving in Peru when the MRTA took hundreds of people hostage at the Japanese
ambassador’s residence in 1996, says it would be “a major mistake” to make
Berenson’s pardon a high priority in U.S.-Peru relations and would risk making
President Toledo appear to be soft on terrorism or as interfering with the courts.  
During his trip to Lima earlier this year, according to the White House, the
President did not ask Toledo to grant Berenson clemency but told Toledo she was
given due process in her second trial and that he was awaiting the recommendation
of the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. Reportedly, the Commission recommended the Peruvian government give
Berenson an “integral reparation.”  Peru said the decision has no legal basis and, in
an extremely unusual move, is filing suit against the Commission before the Inter-
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American Court of Human Rights.  This apparently preempts an anticipated
Commission recommendation that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reopen
her case.  If the case were reopened, the Court’s decision would be legally binding
on OAS member state Peru.  The Court could uphold the sentence, order a retrial, or
order Peru to set Berenson free – her only option for release other than a presidential
pardon, which Peru has indicated is unlikely.12
President Bush became the first U.S. President to visit Peru when he traveled
to Lima on March 23, 2002.  Presidents Bush and Toledo pledged to jointly fight
terrorism and narcotics trafficking .  President Toledo, along with the Presidents of
Colombia and Bolivia and Vice President of Ecuador, urged President Bush to extend
and expand the Andean Trade Preference Act, which expired in December 2001.
Congress later reauthorized and expanded the program, and the President signed it
into law (P.L. 107-210) on August 6.
President Bush discussed several other U.S. initiatives involving Peru during his
visit, including the provision of $50 million over the next 5 years to support
consolidating democratic reform; $3.5 million to support the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in investigating past human rights abuses; the continued
declassification and delivery of State Department documents requested by Peru’s
Congress to support its investigation into corruption and abuses under the Fujimori
government; and the re-establishment, after a 27-year absence, of the Peace Corps
program in Peru.  A debt-for-nature swap, which was agreed to at the meeting, was
signed on June 26.  Under the agreement,  part of Peru’s foreign debt was cancelled
in return for the Peruvian government’s commitment of resources to conserve and
maintain wildlife reserves and other protected areas.
For further information, see CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery from Crisis,
and CRS Report RS20536, Peruvian Elections in 2000: Congressional Concerns and
Policy Approaches, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
Venezuela 
Massive opposition protests and military pressure led to the ouster of President
Hugo Chavez from power on April 12, 2002, but Chavez ultimately was restored to
power two days later, again with the support of the military.  Chavez was ousted
from office after protests by hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans and the death of
at least 14 people, allegedly shot by pro-government supporters. Senior Venezuelan
military leaders expressed outrage at the massacre of unarmed civilians and blamed
President Chavez and his supporters.  Business leader Pedro Carmona was appointed
by the military to head an interim government but quickly lost the support of the
military when he took such hardline measures as dismantling the National Assembly,
firing the Supreme Court, and suspending the Constitution.  Carmona stepped down
just a day after he took office, paving the way for Chavez’s return to power early in
the morning of April 14.  The interim government’s hardline polices as well as strong
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support in the streets from Chavez supporters convinced military commanders to
back Chavez’s return.  Moreover, some military factions had continued to support
Chavez during his ouster.  
Upon his return, Chavez appealed for reconciliation and promised new lines of
communication with the opposition, yet his government also began purging the
military of officials who had supported his ouster. U.S. officials have expressed
concerns about continued polarization in Venezuela, and have urged the Chavez
government and the opposition to engage in dialogue to overcome their differences.
U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, have called on the
Organization of American States to play a role to help Venezuela strengthen its
democratic institutions.
Since the election of Chavez as President in 1998, Venezuela has undergone
enormous political changes, with a new constitution and revamped political
institutions.  Critics and other observers have raised concerns about his government
and fear that the President is moving toward authoritarian rule with his domination
of most government institutions.  Chavez’s popularity has eroded since mid-2001,
amid concerns that his government has been ineffective in improving living
conditions in Venezuela. Opposition to his rule has grown into a broad coalition of
political parties, unions, and business leaders, along with several senior military
officers, while Chavez maintains strong support among the poor.  
As of August 2002, political tensions in Venezuela remained high, with
increased polarization between Chavez supporters and opponents and no meaningful
dialogue taking place between the two.  Disparate opposition groups have begun to
unite in an effort to remove Chavez from power.  The opposition is focusing on
efforts to hold Chavez accountable for the death of civilian protestors in April and
to push for a national referendum on the Chavez presidency in August 2003.13
The United States has traditionally had close relations with Venezuela,
characterized by an important trade and investment relationship and cooperation in
combating the production and transit of illicit drugs. Under the Chavez government,
however, there has been friction in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. In November 2001,
the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela was recalled for consultations as a sign of
displeasure with Chavez’s statement regarding the war in Afghanistan that the United
States was “responding to terror with terror.”14 The State Department also expressed
concern in early January 2002 about attempts by Chavez supporters to intimidate the
opposition and the press.  U.S. officials emphasized that those seeking political
change in the country should pursue it democratically and constitutionally.15   
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In the aftermath of Chavez’s ouster, the United States expressed solidarity with
the Venezuelan people, commended the Venezuelan military for refusing to fire on
peaceful demonstrators, and maintained that undemocratic actions committed or
encouraged by the Chavez administration provoked the political crisis.16  With
Chavez’s return to power, the United States called on President Chavez to heed the
message sent by the Venezuelan people by correcting the course of his administration
and “governing in a fully democratic manner.”17  In contrast to the United States,
many Latin American nations condemned the overthrow of Chavez, labeling it a
coup. However, the United States did support a resolution in the Organization of
American States (OAS) that condemned the “alteration of constitutional order in
Venezuela.”  Amid subsequent opposition protests to Chavez’s rule, the State
Department stressed that the United States “does not and will not condone an
unconstitutional, undemocratic interruption in the democratic order by any party in
Venezuela.”18
Key U.S. interests in Venezuela include continued U.S. access to Venezuelan
oil reserves, the largest outside of the Middle East; promotion and protection of U.S.
trade and investment; the preservation of democracy; and continued close anti-
narcotics cooperation. The Bush Administration allocated $5.5 million in FY2002
assistance for Venezuela as part of the anti-drug strategy of the Andean Regional
Initiative and is requesting $8.5 million in FY2003 assistance. 
For additional information, see CRS Report RS20978, Venezuela: Political
Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan.
V.  Brazil and the Southern Cone
Brazil
Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso is in the last year of his second
term, with  presidential and congressional elections approaching in October 2002
amid doubts about the survivability of his free market-oriented governmental
coalition.  Cardoso was first elected in 1994 and was resoundingly reelected to a
second term in 1998, largely on the basis of the success of his anti-inflation Real Plan
and voters’ confidence that he could best deal with mounting national and
international economic difficulties.  In his second term he has adopted austere
budgets, moved to a floating exchange rate, obtained $41.5 billion from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and imposed temporary energy rationing when
a severe drought hampered hydroelectric energy production.  Minister of Health Jose
Serra emerged in early 2002 as Cardoso’s preferred candidate, but he is trailing in
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public opinion polls behind perennial leftist presidential candidate Luis Inacio Lula
da Silva of the Workers Party and Ciro Gomes of the Labor Front.
During the last few years, Brazil has had moderate economic success while
generally maintaining tight fiscal and monetary policies.  It avoided the projected
economic contraction in 1999, grew at an encouraging 4.5% rate in 2000, and
achieved a 1.6% rate of growth in 2001, despite an energy crisis and the threat of
contagion from Argentina’s economic uncertainties.  In September 2001, Brazil
negotiated a new $15.58 billion stand-by credit with the IMF for support through
December 2002, with tough fiscal and monetary targets. 
In 2002, the country continued to experience difficulties associated with the
crisis in Argentina and the stagnant growth in the United States, compounded as the
year advanced by doubts about the likely economic policies of the leading
presidential candidates.  In this environment, investors sought to reduce their
exposure in Brazil, with resulting pressure on the real and the current account and
Brazil’s level of indebtedness.  By early August 2002, with the real falling about 25%
since the first of the year, indexed dollar-denominated debt increasing with the
decline of the real, and banks unwilling to roll over debt, Brazil’s credit rating fell
so low that it was lower than any other nation except Argentina and Nigeria.  Facing
the prospect of serious financial difficulties, on August 7, 2002, the IMF announced
that Brazil had negotiated a new $30 billion stand-by credit package, under similar
fiscal and monetary targets, with $6 billion to be available in 2002 and $24 billion
to be available in 2003, under a new president.  Although the markets were initially
skeptical of this agreement because of the lack of commitment by the leading
presidential candidates, at meetings between the candidates and President Cardoso
on August 19, 2002, the candidates agreed to the fiscal targets spelled out in the
agreement, without fully committing to the agreements.19  Brazilian officials are
arranging a meeting in New York with representatives of major banks to persuade
them to roll over loans as they come due, rather than to demand payment.20
In the foreign policy area, Brazil’s relations with the neighboring countries of
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, which together with Brazil form the Southern
Common Market (Mercosur), strengthened significantly in the 1990s, although
Brazil’s devaluation of the real and Argentina’s economic difficulties are posing new
challenges to the subregional bloc.  Brazil and members of Mercosur have emerged
as the major advocates of a slower approach to achieving an agreement on a Free
Trade Area of Americas ( FTAA), insisting that free trade must include agricultural
products and must establish limits to unilateral actions of various sorts.  Even so,
relations with the United States are friendly as demonstrated by President Cardoso’s
visits with President Bush in Washington, D.C. and Quebec, Canada  The two
countries are cooperating in many areas, despite trade disputes, including the Bush
Administration’s imposition of temporary safeguard tariffs on foreign steel products
and the agricultural subsidies in the new U.S. Farm Bill.
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For additional information, see CRS Report RL30121, Brazil under Cardoso:
Politics, Economics, and Relations with the United States, by K. Larry Storrs; and
CRS Report 98-987, Brazil’s Economic Reform and the Global Financial Crisis, by
J.F. Hornbeck.
Argentina 
In December 2001, Argentina’s financial collapse and escalating social unrest
forced President Fernando de la Rua’s resignation.  On January 1, 2002, the
Argentine Congress selected Eduardo Duhalde to complete the December 2003
presidential term and face the country’s economic rebuilding.  As Peronist Party
leader, a former Vice President (under Menem), and Governor of Buenos Aires
Province, Duhalde has been a longtime political force and frequent critic of
Argentina’s market-based reforms.  The seeds of Argentina’s financial and political
crisis were planted in 1991 with adoption of its currency board to fight
hyperinflation.  The Convertibility Law legally guaranteed the convertibility of peso
currency to dollars at a one-to-one fixed rate, and monetary policy was forcibly
constrained to uphold that promise. Although this program achieved its goal of
reducing inflation, to remain credible over the long run, it required continuing strong
economic growth and disciplined macroeconomic policies, particularly if it were to
weather the inevitable external shock.
Argentina proved unable to enforce the economic policies needed to support the
convertibility plan and was eventually beset by numerous external shocks.  Nagging
fiscal deficits, growing debt, and deepening current account deficits, combined with
Brazil’s January 1999 devaluation, the dollar appreciation, rising interest rates, and
the global downturn in 2001, trapped the country in a four-year recession, with little
room to effect a solution.  Over time, and despite repeated assistance from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), confidence waned in Argentina’s ability
simultaneously to reverse its recession, correct its fiscal deficit, honor its foreign debt
obligations, and maintain the convertibility plan.  Last ditch financial policies, such
as forced debt restructuring and limiting bank withdrawals, strained credibility
abroad and incited rioting at home, culminating in the current economic and political
crisis.
President Duhalde’s economic program initially centered on abandoning the
currency board and the peso’s 1-to-1 peg with the dollar in favor of a dual exchange
rate system based on a highly devalued peso.  Bank loans were converted to pesos at
the 1-to-1 rate, but dollar savings and checking accounts, although initially
guaranteed, were soon converted to pesos at a rate of 1.4 to the dollar.  De la Rua’s
restrictions on bank withdrawals (the “corralito”) were continued.  The mismatch in
the conversion rate of bank deposits and liabilities, and a Supreme Court ruling
calling the bank withdrawal restrictions unconstitutional, forced the Duhalde
government to abandon the dual exchange rate.  It let the peso float, converted any
remaining dollar accounts to pesos, but retained the previous official rate of 1.4 pesos
to the dollar for deposits, retaining a serious balance sheet problem for banks.
Many financial, legal, and regulatory issues needed fixing, such as redefining
bankruptcy procedures and repealing the economic subversion law, two issues that
dragged on for months but which were eventually resolved to the satisfaction of many
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constituent groups.  Although these changes were in keeping with IMF and U.S.
policy preferences for Argentina, they represented only a beginning to the political
and economic reconstruction process facing the country.  Policy responses to
restructuring Argentina’s massive foreign debt, as well as a comprehensive economic
plan to renew growth, have yet to materialize.  The delays have been costly,
accounting for the postponement of a new IMF assistance package.
Argentina’s continuing dismal economic prospects present a huge political
challenge for Duhalde, leading him in July to announce the advancement of
presidential elections to March 2003, six months earlier than expected.  The
Argentine economy has so far contracted by 15% in 2002, with poverty and
unemployment reaching historic levels, a continuing recipe for domestic social
unrest.  Foreign investors are also unsure whether to continue operating in Argentina.
Policy options remain difficult.  Recapitalizing and eliminating restrictions on the
banking system are critical aspects to restarting the economy and reducing social
tensions.  This will require IMF and other international assistance, which has been
impeded by questions still lingering over Argentina’s policy direction on tax reform,
fiscal management, and establishing a monetary anchor to deal with rising inflation.
In addition, the Argentine government faces deep institutional reform before it is
likely to win back the confidence of the Argentine people, many of whom have
expressed distrust of the state for abandoning fundamental social, legal, and
economic contracts.  The implications for broader policy issues, such as moving
ahead on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and maintaining close ties
with the United States, are now less certain.  Under these circumstances, the world
is watching to see if Argentina’s economic and political situation deteriorates further
or begins to show some sign of revival.  The crisis has also raised questions about the
role of the IMF and whether it might have encouraged a different course for
Argentina at an earlier date, when the costs of transitioning from its convertibility
plan would have been much lower.
For more information, see CRS Report RS21072, The Financial Crisis in
Argentina, by J. F. Hornbeck, CRS Report RS21130, The Argentine Financial Crisis:
A Chronology of Events,  and CRS Report RS21113, Argentina’s Political Upheaval,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
Chile
U.S.-Chilean relations, which improved considerably with the nation’s return
to democracy in 1990, are close and are characterized by strong commercial ties and
extensive consultations between the two governments on bilateral and other issues
of mutual concern. Since 1994, U.S.-Chilean relations have centered on negotiating
a free trade agreement, with the expectation initially that Chile would accede to the
North American Free Trade Agreement.  Although this did not come about, the
United States and Chile did commence formal negotiations on a bilateral free trade
agreement (FTA) on December 6-7, 2000, in Washington, D.C.   Despite Chile’s
widely regarded economic track record and willingness to address a wide spectrum
of issues, differences in how to address controversial provisions, such as those on
labor, environment, and antidumping measures, are the main hurdles to clear.
Passage of trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation in August 2002 (P.L. 107-
210) is expected to help expedite negotiations, given congressional guidance on a
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number of critical issues.  A detailed agreement, however, may still be a few months
off, given that the most controversial issues remain to be resolved.  Other topics at
issue in the negotiations include market access, Chile’s price band system on some
agricultural products, intellectual property rights, and investor-state disputes.
Another issue in bilateral relations has been the sale of advanced combat fighter
aircraft to Chile.  In November 2001, a preliminary agreement was reached between
the Chilean military and Lockheed Martin for the purchase of 10 F-16 fighter jets.
President Lagos made his final decision in late January 2002 to go ahead with the
sale, reportedly valued at $660 million.  The purchase does not include the advanced
medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) in which Chile expressed interest.
Some U.S. Senators had concerns that the inclusion of such missiles could spark an
arms race in the region.
For background information see CRS Report RL30035, Chile: Political/
Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan.  For information on
U.S.-Chile trade relations, see CRS Report RL31144, A U.S.-Chile Free Trade
Agreement: Economic and Trade Policy Issues, by J.F. Hornbeck; and CRS Issue
Brief IB10077, Agricultural Trade Issues in the 107th Congress, by Charles E.
Hanrahan, Geoffrey S. Becker, and Remy Jurenas.
